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Are We Accepting the Challenge?*

FRANCIS J. FRIEDEL, S.M.

The sociologist, being a social scientist, must be a prophet of some sort insofar as generalizations may lead to predictions. In searching into the activities of men in their social relationships, he finds cause and effect, progress or regress, an ebb and flow. Society never stands still; it is ever in a state of flux; it is ever in transition, though each age may boast that it is a transitional period. Society cannot be placed under perfectly controlled laboratory conditions, for in the very process of examination change is going on. In order to view the movement of society in true perspective, the sociologist must seek a point of vantage from which he can distinguish the origins as well as the directions which the movements of society take.

In a restricted sense, the sociologist has fulfilled his function of social scientist if he is satisfied to investigate a great many social facts, which he observes, tabulates, classifies, and sums up in a fine array of mathematical symbols or pictorial devices. In their scramble to get on the scientific band wagon and avoid the accusation of being unscientific, too many sociologists have felt it imperative that they adopt blindly the methods of the natural scientist because these methods have yielded such valuable results in their particular domain. They forget that they are dealing with human beings, capable of free choices, and not with molecules and atoms which can be fixated to some degree for purposes of investigation.

To each age, there comes challenge upon challenge, for human beings will ever have their social problems that cry for solution. To us, who claim to be Catholic sociologists, there come the many challenges presented by the social crises of our day. To what degree have we given answer to these challenges? We have given some answer; it is not easy to say how complete the answer is. There are many contemporary Catholic social movements that are striving to meet the problem of today. It is rather difficult to describe and evaluate them; we are so close to them that we may miss their sig-

* Presidential Address given before the American Catholic Sociological Society, December 28, 1941, New York, N. Y.

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nificance; we may lose ourselves in some detail and overlook essential elements. We are part of them. We are, perhaps, helping to shape them and give them direction. We need to have insight and prophetic vision so as to see their implications and the direction in which programs of social reconstruction are going.

The first challenge that presents itself to us is to clarify our position as Catholic sociologists. Shall we be social philosophers, social scientists, or social reformers? We have not sufficiently differentiated social philosophy from sociology proper and these two from social reconstruction or action. Much of our so-called Catholic sociology has been social philosophy and more particularly social ethics. All through the ages of the Church there has been much thinking about problems of community and social life. For several centuries the influence of Catholic social thought was virtually nil. Since the last century, there has been a resurgence of Catholic social thinking especially in France and Germany and more recently in the United States. The earlier Catholic sociologists, who have rendered a signal service, have particularly stressed social ethics. A leader like Franz Mueller is pointing out, in season and out, that we must avoid methodological confusion by a strict distinction of the formal objects of sociology, and that sociology is a science, an empirical science, relatively autonomous. There is justification for such insistence.

On the other hand, we do not reconcile ourselves to the assumption that we can compartmentalize ourselves to such a degree that we can separate social philosophy from the science of sociology and from consequent social action. Can we be social philosophers, sociologists and social reformers or reconstructionists at the same time? Secular sociologists have, to a considerable extent, repudiated a social philosophy, on the ground that their domain was exclusively the investigation, observation, analysis, and classification of social phenomena and the formulation of certain general principles derived from these activities. We, in contrast, have been too much the social philosophers. A social philosophy is fundamentally a normative science because it deals with ultimates, with what should be and how things should be. Sociology investigates and reconstructs social life as it is. Social philosophy will judge reality after comparing the real situation with the ideal. Often sociology loses sight of its purely objective science of reality and itself becomes a thinly disguised social philosophy in its advocacy of definite attitudes toward

life. There is some comfort in the thought that some secular sociologists are becoming disturbed at the current threats to their own cherished social value and are beginning to wonder whether they should not be concerned with value judgments after all; they are willing to step out of their role of cold-blooded, objective scientists; they are becoming social philosophers.

Sociology cannot get along without social philosophy and vice versa; they must lend each other mutual support. Sociology must use basic principles provided by social philosophy and the latter, in turn, must maintain contact with objective reality.

What is our answer? Let's confess that we have not been above confusion in our thinking and investigation; we have philosophized when we should have faced fact with fact. We should equal any scientist in our precision and objectivity. Then we may measure up facts with social principles to see how they conform with objective norms. From then on, social action begins. I don't believe any of us would be satisfied with saying: "I have conducted abundant and careful research; here are my findings; my job is done." If we are purists, we might be content with saying that we don't even know whether a given situation is right or wrong; it is the reformer's task to do something about it. Call it reform, or social reconstruction, or social reorganization — here is a part of our mission to initiate or take part in social movements that will make for the good society; movement implies activity; capable leadership will determine the direction of the activity.

The second challenge lies in the contemporary world situation. There is much talk of a "new world order"; underlying the concepts of world order are basically contradictory ideologies. We, in this country, have been under the influence of the so-called liberal or laissez-faire philosophy, which is fundamentally individualistic. A contrary movement has grown to vast proportions and goes under the names of Communism, Naziism, or Fascism; here the individual is submerged in the totality. He has no rights except as grants of the state; he exists only for the state which represents the group. The extreme individualist may lose sight of social responsibility in his emphasis on the inviolability of the individual; the collectivist or totalitarian disregards the dignity of the individual personality. The individual is the elemental unit of the group; the group has no personality, mind, will, or entity of its own. The group is an aggregation of individuals united for common purposes.

We need to stress the concept of social solidarism, which stands sharply distinguished from the collectivist theory denying the dignity and relative autonomy of the person, and also from atomistic individualism which ignores the organic structure of society. Both the independence and inviolability of the individual and social structure are important realities.

A movement that is still in a somewhat inchoate state and yet is discernible is that initiated and led by Paul Hanly Furfey. It matters little whether there are many direct participants in a movement somewhat akin to the Franciscanism of the thirteenth century. For some, it has taken shape in a definite way of life. The foundation of the movement is what Father Furfey calls supernatural sociology; the basis is essentially personalist. Many of us will recall the discussion on certain applications of details of the program. No one can quarrel with the fundamental principles: reconstruction of society must take place through the sanctification of the individual; social problems are ultimately moral problems; society cannot be reformed except through a return to Christ. The late Virgil Michel has similarly contributed much to social reorganization by urging and spreading greater participation in social worship. Lay groups, practicing voluntary poverty, sharing in the more abundant life of the Mystical Body, will become a ferment in society. It is hoping for too much to expect a complete reform in society because of the fact that many in our country would not comprehend these basic principles.

It is rather useless to talk to a man about goodness when he needs food, clothing, and shelter. He has to live before he can philosophize. The great and pitiless evil of our day is the gross neglect of the basic rights of the individual, dependent for his livelihood upon a job that nets him wages, frequently inadequate for a decent standard of living.

Because of the growth of corporatism, urbanism, and commercialism we are becoming a proletarian society with consequent serious spiritual, social, and political losses. The worker is becoming a wage slave. There is no one of us who would have dared to use the strong terms employed by Leo XIII and Pius XI in describing the conditions of the laboring classes. Wealth is inequitably distributed; the worker is not receiving a fair share of the product. Insecurity becomes the lot of the generality of the people because they are leading a hand-to-mouth existence, dependent for their liv-

ing upon a wage which, in turn, is conditioned by the steadiness or regularity of employment.

The problem, or rather problems, related to the worker have been attacked from many angles by Catholic social action groups. The great social Popes have reminded Catholic leaders to go to the worker. It does not suffice to inveigh against greed and injustice; positive, constructive action must follow.

The *Catholic Worker* movement has been one of the most comprehensive and significant movements in taking up the cause of the workingman. To some well-intentioned but misinformed persons, Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin and others in their group are radicals — which for them means Communists or socialists. They are radicals — with the radicalism of Christ, because they are fearless in their stand on behalf of the wage-earner. We may disagree with them on particular issues; differences can be a healthy sign. The leaders of this movement saw the inroads of Communism in the ranks of the great working class. There is no doubt that the accusations against capitalism were valid, but the remedy would be worse than the ill itself. The *Catholic Worker* group realized that the Catholic Church could get a hearing with its marvelous social doctrines. What is striking in the movement is the multi-sided attack on the problem with a positive program. Houses of Hospitality, scattered through the land, while relieving the needs of the destitute are centers for Catholic social propaganda and training of true labor leadership and followership. The *Catholic Worker* group have stood for the right to organize and so have not hesitated to aid in strikes by lawful and moral devices. Their farming commune and their camp for conscientious objectors have interesting potentialities.

Other frontal attacks on the problems of the workingman are found in the programs sponsored by the ACTU, the labor schools, the *Social Action* group of Detroit, and many other organizations. Recognizing that unionism is the means at hand in our present social and economic set-up for securing and maintaining some of the fundamental rights of the working class, they seek to develop articulate leadership and intelligent followership with constant regard for ethical principles. By the spoken and printed word, by classes, by discussion and debate, these ends are promoted.

Another great challenge to us is the decline in population and the breakdown of the family. The family is the natural, essential unit of economic life; when it ceases to be that, it ceases also to

be the natural unit of social life. If its activity and structure are choked, it deteriorates. This stunting of the growth of the family is a recognized feature of urbanism. Urbanization has contributed much to the breakdown of the family and to the general decline of the population. City life tends to draw the members of the family apart. With urban life go all the concomitants of industrialization. Economic difficulties are said to be at the bottom of birth restriction. However, even in the higher economic brackets where the means exist for raising a large family, there are few, if any, children. Only recently has a little spurt in the birth rate been noted; what appeals to the moral sense could not accomplish, the draft has helped to achieve.

O. E. Baker of the U. S. Department of Agriculture envisages a nation of middle-aged persons and a declining nation within the next few decades. "No nation can suffer such a decrease — over twenty percent — and not suffer the decline in strength that accompanies a rapid aging of the population."

Many men of vision, particularly priests, are concerned about what is happening to the home and the family and also to the nation. A number of movements are making their impact felt. There is little use in tirades against the immorality and social consequences of birth control. Where the economic factor plays a part in family restriction, suitable helps must be provided. These may be in the form of subsidies as sponsored by various types of maternity guilds. Another approach, the more direct one, is to work steadfastly at securing a living wage for bread-winners, so that it becomes possible for them to raise a family in decent comfort and relative security.

If the city is the graveyard of the nation, then it follows that people must be kept or put on the land in greater numbers either in full-time or part-time farming. Monsignor Ligutti and Father Rawe express it simply in their *Rural Roads to Security*: "There is much room on the land for many people with the correct rural philosophy of life, much room for more real homes, more economic security, more children, more loyalty to the family and to national ideas. The land is the foundation of the family, and the family is the foundation of the State." A great rural life movement is in progress. It is comforting to note the part Catholic leaders are playing in this movement.

The purpose of the movement is not so much to rebel against all forms of mass production but to encourage the development of the food-producing homestead. Modern technology and its advantages need not be abandoned, but the foundation of a new social and economic order can be laid through the agrarian movement. Family life can be saved, true democracy lived, religious ideals preserved, liberty enjoyed, and contentment rediscovered. Men build up self-reliance and a sense of superiority and independence that comes from cooperating with nature. Included in the broad movement for establishing homesteads must be mentioned the very live and active work of many persons in the growth of cooperatives. Our Canadian cousins have given us fine demonstrations of the possibility of this type of enterprise. The names of Father Schmiedeler, Monsignor Ligutti, Father Rawe, Sister Anne Burns and others must be indentified with many of these vigorous movements.

One challenge that has hardly been met is the one presented by the 13,000,000 Negroes of our land. Only about 300,000 of them belong to the Church; more than half are unchurched. For the most part, their contacts with the Catholic Church have been few. We ourselves have not been above common prejudices; we have not always been Christian in our relations with persons of the Negro race. Men like Father LaFarge and the late Father Gillard have rendered a great service over years in bringing the plight of the Negro to the attention of Catholics. We claim to be a democracy in this country, and yet we fail to observe the most elemental principles of democracy toward an important segment of our population. We cannot ignore and discriminate against he Negroes without at the same time inflicting harm on the whole social body. We are dealing with prejudice, which is something irrational, and therefore hard to counteract. But deal with it we must or prove ourselves false to our social principles.

The American Catholic Sociological Society is a young organization; before its inception, the movements to which we have referred had already begun. We can lay no claim to having helped to give them birth, but we can lay claim that we are helping to stimulate them. During the sessions of our conventions, experts in the social fields have discussed and shared with us their experiences. New lights on problems have been shed, new approaches presented. Our organization is young and relatively weak, but year by year it is increasing its strength and influence.

We cannot hope either individually or collectively to answer all the challenges offered us by the complex social situations that arise at every instant, but we have the right to expect that we shall be able through our contacts with one another, through our discussions and publications, to pool our thinking and enrich our resources by co-operative effort. If we should attempt to work at all the problems indicated, we should disperse our energies too far afield and arrive nowhere. Each one of us can and should take some special projects as his own and become the center of activity in his community for social reconstruction along specific lines.

May I outline briefly a program for the members of the ACSS, that will serve as our answer to the challenges offered us in the world today?

1. To maintain our social equilibrium in this time of crisis.
2. To prepare ourselves for the great task, that will devolve upon us after the emergency.
3. To resist with all our might the absorption of the individual by the social group, particularly through the increasing control of government of every phase of individual and social life.
4. To become centers of social influence in our particular communities.
5. To engage in more extensive social research.
6. Insofar as we are educators, to develop a stronger social consciousness in students.
7. To help build up a strong body of social doctrine.
8. To take our part in social planning that will make for a more harmonious social world.
9. To work for the stability and integration of the family, the basic unit of society.
10. To take more than an academic interest in promoting the interests of wage-earners.
11. To secure justice for the Negro.
12. To promote social solidarity, and, by that token, true democracy, by upholding the rights, the dignity, and worth of the individual and emphasizing the individual's responsibility to society.

University of Dayton

Sociology and Fundamental Values

HOWARD E. JENSEN

Contemporary sociology has arrived at no consensus with regard to the problem of values and the valuational aspects of experience, and there is no immediate prospect of attaining it. For these differences are rooted in more fundamental differences of methodology, and there is no possibility of transcending them until these more basic differences are resolved. For notwithstanding the increasing emphasis on research in American sociology during the past quarter of a century, the methodology of the subject remains in a backward and chaotic state. Sociologists have indeed done some excellent work in elaborating the techniques of research in connection with their factual investigations of various types of social phenomena. In their surveys, their case studies, their statistical and ecological analyses, they have exercised much ingenuity in devising technical procedures for manipulating the phenomena under investigation and for defining their variables with greater precision, so as to yield more accurate observations and a more dependable body of social data. But little attention has been paid to methodology in the historical sense of the term, as a critical inquiry into the basic assumptions of a science concerning the nature of the phenomena investigated and the logical methods of their scientific interpretation. Consequently, most of the handbooks on social research are manuals on fact finding rather than methodological treatises. They either implicitly ignore or explicitly repudiate methodological problems in their historical sense, and confuse methodology with the technological aspects of scientific investigation.

All contemporary sociologists are agreed that sociology, as distinguished from social philosophy, must be developed by the methods of empirical science, that is, by the observation and analysis of data, and by the formulation and testing of hypotheses to explain them. But this agreement is verbal only, for they differ radically in their conceptions of empirical methodology with regard to both data and techniques. One school, taking its cue from the physical sciences, holds that all empirical data are data of sense experience, and that all valid scientific techniques are devices for their observa-

tion and conceptualization. Consequently, sociology is a science of overt behavior, and the inner life of thought and feeling, if it is considered at all, is treated as inferences drawn from the data of external observation, in precisely the same sense as are the physicist's inferences concerning the internal structure of the atom. But the epistemological position of this school is unstable. As to whether sense perception can give us valid knowledge of a world of reality external to the knower, or as to whether such a world indeed exists, there is no agreement.

The opposing school understands empiricism in a much wider sense. The empirical includes all that is experienced, whether externally in sense perception or internally in our own conscious states, and empirical method sets out from these data, whether observed by sense organs or by introspection, and tests its conclusions by an appeal to both methods of observation. It grants that techniques of sensory observation are more easily refined than are those of introspection, that the quantitative description of the former is more accurate than the qualitative description of the latter, and that consequently, our knowledge of physical nature is more completely expressible in terms of mechanico-causal laws that enable us to predict and control than is our knowledge of human nature and culture. For in the physical sciences all the relevant data are observable by means of our senses and the technological devices for their extension and refinement, but in the psychological and social sciences, such is not the case.

Sociologists who maintain that the equation of the empirical with the observation and conceptualization of sense data is methodologically as adequate for the psychological and social sciences as it is for those dealing with physical nature hold that wishes, impulses, motives, intentions, and other so-called "subjective" aspects of man's individual and social behavior are inferences drawn from observed facts in the same sense as are those of the physicist regarding electrons or quanta. But they overlook that such aspects of behavior are in no sense inferences from observed data. They are not known meditatively through observation, but immediately in our own experience, and projected into the situation by what Charles Horton Cooley aptly called "sympathetic introspection." They are not inferences, but imputations. Were it not for our direct knowledge of the role they play in our own experience, we should have no grounds for imputing them to others. Such experiences are not definable

except in terms of themselves. As well try to explain the experience of sound or color to the congenitally blind or deaf as to explain the experiences of desire to a sociologist who has never had one. Psychiatric case records give testimony to the incapacity of certain individuals in whom normal sex feelings are constitutionally absent or inadequately developed to understand "crimes of passion," or even such normal institutional behavior as normal family life. And anthropological literature demonstrates how precarious is the field work of the research worker who has not lived with his people long enough to understand their culture, not only as it *appears* to the observer, but as it *feels* to the participant. As MacIver has well said,

In social causation there is a logical order of relationship between the factors that we do not find in physical causation. There is an essential difference, from the standpoint of causation, between a paper flying before the wind and a man flying before a crowd. The paper knows no fear and the wind no hate, but without fear and hate the man would not fly nor the crowd pursue. If we try to reduce fear to its bodily concomitants we merely substitute the concomitants for the reality experienced as fear. We denude the world of meaning for the sake of a theory, itself a false meaning which deprives us of all the rest.¹

From this methodological standpoint, human valuations constitute the dynamic factors in man's social and cultural behavior. Culture is itself a vast accumulation of objects and instrumentalities for the realization, stabilization, and maximization of value-experiences, and the development of culture in turn furnishes a changing and differentiating environment within which value-experiences themselves undergo further differentiation and development.

It is a large-scale moulding matrix; a giant conditioning apparatus. In each generation it produces its type of individual. In each generation it is in turn reshaped by its carriers.²

Man, unlike any other animal, lives in an environment he has himself created, an environment which is consequently artificial in the etymological sense of the term; that is, it is not dependent for its development and differentiation upon biological changes in man's

¹ Robert M. MacIver, *Society, a Text Book of Sociology*, pp. 476f. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1937.

² Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture as a Determinant of Behavior," p. 440. *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 43 (Nov., 1936).

original nature, but upon the knowledge he has learned as *homo sapiens* and the skill he has acquired as *homo faber*.

If sociology as a science of culturally conditioned behavior is at all possible, it must be because empirical investigation discloses certain structural and functional similarities in all cultures which render them comparable, and hence subject to generalization. Otherwise there must be as many sociologies as there are cultural groups to investigate. And these similarities are in turn due to the underlying similarities in the human valuation which produced them, similarities, that is to say, in the original and derived needs which culture was constructed to satisfy. Whatever matters, or makes a difference, or is advantageous to man is a value to man, and the awareness that it matters, or makes a difference, or is advantageous, constitutes an experience of value. We may ask the purely empirical question, "In what aspects of experience does such awareness arise? What types of relationship does man experience in which things matter or make a difference?"

First of all among the things that matter are the satisfactions arising out of certain organic needs essential to the physical maintenance of the individual and the race: hunger, thirst, sex, warmth, activity. The satisfaction of these needs leads to such cultural inventions, activities, and forms of human association as the production, exchange and consumption of foods, beverages, houses, and clothing, as well as family life, sports and games. These physical valuations are as widespread as sentient life. But in man alone do they undergo cultural elaboration, and man alone manifests other aspects of experience, at least in a highly developed and differentiated form, in which things matter or make a difference. It is not bread alone that matters, and if it were, it is certain that even bread would be scarce. For the satisfaction of physical needs requires knowledge, and truth matters, not only intrinsically, for its own sake, but instrumentally, as a means to the satisfaction of all other needs. This leads to such cultural developments as common sense knowledge, philosophy, and science, and institutions of research and education.

Space forbids the discussion of all the types of relationship or experience in which things matter or make a difference to man, and of the cultural instrumentalities he has developed to satisfy them. A mere list must suffice. In addition to the physical and the intellectual already mentioned, we have still to add the moral, the aesthetic, and the religious. These valuations are common to all societies,

and they and their secondary elaborations constitute a frame of reference within which all the elements of culture can be observed, described, analyzed, classified, and compared.

Value-experiences are individual, particular, indefinable, historical facts. That I experience a good now, either of pleasure or truth or virtue or beauty or holiness, is an elemental fact, not subject to error, and from it there is no appeal. The fact that you experience a disvalue in relation to the same datum is wholly irrelevant to my value-experience. Value-experiences are in this sense subjective, relative, and usually ephemeral, "Like snow upon the desert's dusty face, lighting a little hour or two, is gone." They are incommunicable, and they admit of no debate.

Is this therefore the end of the matter? By no means, for we have yet to distinguish these experiences of value from judgments about value. If we are in normal bodily and mental health, and live in an environment reasonably conducive to both, we are experiencing value every waking hour. But for the most part, these values are so nearly subliminal and transitory that we take them for granted. But when they become intense enough to thrust themselves into the focus of consciousness, or when we attend to them with a conscious recognition that "This is good," we are formulating a judgment about value. Such judgments are cognitive in character, and like all judgments, subject to error. It is precisely this failure to distinguish between value-experiences and value-judgments that has introduced interminable confusion into the scientific discussion of this problem in sociology. The realm of science, it is said, is a public domain of shared knowledge, while the realm of values is a private domain of personal preferences.

But value-judgments can not be so cavalierly dismissed as wholly irrational and arbitrary. They are subjective and relative only in the sense that all experience, including all knowledge, descriptive no less than valuational, is subjective and relative. They are as public and communicable as any scientific judgments. They are also objective in the sense that they are the products of critical reflection on the part of a rational mind working in accordance with its own laws, examining data and subjecting them to more general standards or universal principles.

Values are always relational. They depend upon some sort of contact or interaction between an experiencing subject and some object, perceptual or conceptual, other than itself. When this rela-

tionship appears in consciousness as desire and the satisfaction of desire, we have an experience of value. But we do not necessarily determine these relationships from moment to moment, by conscious reflection and rational choice. For the most part, they are so deeply embedded in our culture and in our personal life organization, or they are so directly conditioned by the basic biological processes and innate behavior equipment of the organism that we take them for granted, or are entirely unconscious of them as automatisms.

Conscious awareness, then, is not a *sine qua non* of value. An object has value to whatever it is important for or interacts with. Some value-relationships exist of which we are not yet aware, as vitamins in the diet. Others, like the non-medicinal use of narcotic drugs, are disvalues, regardless of the strength of our desires or the intensity of our satisfactions.

It is the task of critical reflection, in value theory no less than in physical science, to pass judgment on common sense knowledge, to reduce it to a body of consistent and coherent propositions in correspondence with the reality it conceptualizes. It treats the entire value-relationship factually. It is a fact that men experience certain satisfactions which they judge to be intrinsically good. It is a fact that they judge certain objects to have intrinsic value because they evoke such satisfactions and other objects to have instrumental value because they are means to such objects. These common-sense judgments, like those of the farmer about the relation of the phases of the moon to his planting, are subject to error, and the sources of error are much the same in both cases. They consist chiefly in affective-volitional mental sets conditioned by the traditional culture, and in inadequate knowledge of the data necessary for competent judgment. And the first can be corrected only through the second. It is the task of science, to collect the empirical data, both sensory and introspective, essential to the testing of value-judgments. The choices based upon such tested value-judgments are not arbitrary. They are rational in the only sense that science recognizes, they are based upon logical conclusions from relevant data.

Of course, the ultimate rationality of all judgments, whether of existence or of value, is not a problem of science, but of metaphysics. Values, and everything else, if they are ultimately to escape from the meaninglessness of subjectivity and relativism, must be grounded in principle, in the nature of being. Science can not determine the place of anything in the totality of experience, and the constantly

recurring statement in sociological literature that all value-judgments, even truth, are irrational, is not science, but metaphysics, and bad metaphysics at that. Science either assumes the reality of its subject-matter, in Santayana's phrase, "with natural piety," or seeks the metaphysical ground of its own existence.

How, then, shall we empirically test the validity of value-judgments? This is most easily accomplished in the field of the physical values. For here the quantitative methods of the physical sciences can carry us far. Science is not concerned with the metaphysical problem as to whether physical survival is a greater good for man than extinction. It takes man's desire for survival as an empirical fact, and attempts scientifically to determine the effect upon physical well-being of certain quantities and qualities of foods, beverages, clothing, shelter, physical activity, etc. It is now rapidly increasing our knowledge of instrumental means to physical well-being, in the field of nutrition for example, and it can provide the rational ground, not only for choice as to the proper means to the maximization of the physical values, but for the developing and disciplining of our desires. *De gustibus non est disputandum* may be true, but the fact that one man prefers to get his vitamins from Brussels sprouts and another from spinach is irrelevant. For these are instrumentalities, and personal preferences between them have no more bearing on the physical values involved than has the preference of the scientist for one piece of apparatus over another equally appropriate upon the intellectual values of his research.

The biological sciences, then, have contributed much to our knowledge of what the physical values are, by what means they may be promoted, and what desires man develops and what restrain if he would attain them. Critical value-judgments, as distinguished from common sense knowledge, are judgments of excellence or conceptual worth. The biological sciences have demonstrated that desire and the satisfaction of desire yield no such criteria in the realm of physical value. Nor do they do so in any other phase of human experience. The biological sciences do not hesitate to establish such criteria in their own field, and they have succeeded well at their task. It is the province of ethics, logic and epistemology, aesthetics, and theology to establish similar criteria in the realms of moral, intellectual, artistic, and religious values. Here the problems are vastly more difficult and the results less accurate than in the field of the physical values because, among other reasons, of the vast bodies of data that

must be considered, their historical and psychological character, and their lack of amenability to quantitative statement and experimental manipulation. But to conclude that the realm of values is therefore a "private domain of personal preferences in which we can have no valid and objectively dependable knowledge" is an unwarranted counsel of despair.

The problems of value and the problems of sociology are reciprocally interdependent and implicated with one another throughout their range. On the one hand, values are relational. Their critical study inquires into all aspects of this relation, not only the intrinsic value-experiences, but also their objects and instrumentalities. And these, as we have seen, are for the most part cultural. On the other hand, the life of the solitary man must always be what Hobbes said it was in the state of nature, "nasty, brutish, and short." The variety, quantity, and quality of value-experiences essential to existence on the human level can be attained only through the collective effort of human beings in association. The forms and processes of human association, the folkways, mores, institutions, social organization,³ which provide the objective data of sociology, constitute a complicated system of instrumentalities for the attainment of ends evaluated as desirable by an uncritical consensus. The common sense value-judgments of the past are in turn handed down from generation to generation and constitute the body of traditional lore by means of which the entire socio-cultural system is maintained and controlled. The institutional behavior of the unreflective masses, no less than their value-judgments, are conditioned by this lore, and it is the function of the sociologist and of the value theorist, each in his own field, to reduce this traditional lore to a consistent and coherent conceptual system, in correspondence with the empirical facts. The sociologist's assumption that the naive man's immediate certainty of the true is not a scientific judgment, but that his equally naive certainty of the good is for value-judgments the Ultima Thule, is a major error which stands as a barrier blocking the progress of sociology as a science.⁴ Only at the price of arduous toil can

³ Referred to *supra* as "culturally conditioned behavior."

⁴ Cf. Howard W. Odum, "Errors of Sociology," *Social Forces*, Vol. 15, p. 162 (March, 1937). "If civilization is largely a matter of values and civilization represents the product of society's ongoing to date, and if sociology is the scientific study of this society, the omission of social values assumes a larger significance than the errors of a pre-Copernican astronomy which assigned to the earth its wrong place in the scheme of things."

man develop the conceptual systems in the light of which he can know either how to do a thing, or whether it is worth doing. It would be strange indeed if competence in science is purchased at such a cost as to lead a famous scientist to say of his work, "There's blood on it!" but that competence in value-judgment is nothing more than an arbitrary preference for Chesterfields or the poems of Edgar A. Guest.

Since both the descriptive and the evaluative discipline pursue logical methods in their attempts to organize experience and render it intelligible in terms of conceptual systems, they may be developed in close cooperation to mutual advantage. They represent a division of labor, not a conflict of interests. *The descriptive and the normative must not be confused*, but they can not be isolated, except to the stultification of both.

All sociologists agree that impartiality is a primary obligation of the scientist. But it is no less an obligation of the student of value. Each must be persistently alert lest his own desires influence his selection of data and thus vitiate his results. Neither is at liberty to impose his own preferences upon others. Competent training in scientific method is indispensable to both. Perhaps if sociologists were equally competent in value theory, they would more adequately satisfy this scientific prerequisite.

The implementation of this point of view in an attack upon the specific problems of sociology must be left to other occasions. We must content ourselves with brief references to two of the fundamental goals of all science, prediction and control. Social phenomena, unlike physical phenomena, can not be predicted without reference to value. For it is precisely its nature as a value, as something to be used, desired or avoided by human beings, that constitutes any fact of experience a datum for sociology. For the most part, social prediction depends upon counting and measuring sensory data, and the dependability of the prediction depends upon the stability of the system of value in which it is implicated. For example, a birth is a biological fact. Births can be counted, their ratio to deaths calculated, and the future growth of population predicted. But a birth is also a socio-cultural fact insofar as it is a locus of value, reenforced or attenuated by its relations to other values in the cultural system. When it has become integrated with religion, as among the Hebrews, where a large progeny was considered evidence of divine favor, or among the Chinese, where numerous descendants

were necessary to assure the continuance of the sacred rites for the dead, the birth rate has approximated its biological maximum. But when, as in Western culture generally, the system of values changes, statistical curves predicting future growth go wrong, and the birth rate drops too low to provide for growth, or even to sustain numbers. It is true that the birth rate may fall because of changes in the physical environment, such as prolonged famine, or because of technological changes, such as contraceptive techniques. But if there has been no change in the underlying value systems, in the first instance, when the famine passes the birth rate will recover, and in the second instance, the contraceptive materials will decay on the shelves of the vendors. And every social situation, like those cited, is shot through and through with value, in the light of which our measurements and predictions get whatever scientific validity they possess.

The same considerations which apply to social prediction are equally pertinent for social control. If we wish to control the social behavior of the individual, we must either apply coercion, or we must change his value-systems by suggestion, persuasion, education, propaganda, or other means. Often the advertiser, the salesman, or the politician is more successful in this respect than the sociologist, not entirely because he is less scrupulous, but because he possesses keener insight into the springs of human action. But if we wish to control the social organization, it is true that we can do but little. This is in no small part due to our failure to study the value-systems implicated in social organization in the interests of a pseudo-objectivity. No sociologist, should occasion warrant, would hesitate to study relation of natural catastrophes to the social organization, to predict their social effects, and to advise about social control. Why should we not do the same for the cultural catastrophes that threaten the social order? Does the cultural fact that no social order has survived the decay of its domestic institutions warrant no predictions, and is all advice concerning their stabilization an "arbitrary preference" at best, and at worst, "an unwarranted attempt to impose our own personal valuations on other people"? Does the historical failure of the balance of power to preserve the peace, ever since its origin among the Italian city states of the early Renaissance, warrant no predictions and throw no light more valid than "wishesful thinking" on the problem of the future international structure of society? And is Malinowski only "projecting his own desires

into the situation" when he concludes that we have left behind the stage of history when warfare could "contribute to the building up of cultures and establishment of states," and that at present "modern warfare has become nothing but an unmitigated disease of civilization"?⁵

In a word, if the sociologist is to do his own job as a scientist, his knowledge of the value-systems implicated in the social organization must be as critically competent as that of the physiologist concerning the physical and chemical processes implicated in the organism he studies. Nor does either abdicate his role as a scientist if he counsels correction of the conditions that threaten disaster to the object of his research.

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⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 444.

The Catholic Approach to Interracialism in France

LOUIS T. ACHILLE

The writer's authority is not based upon formal sociological training, but on his personal investigation and experience of racial attitudes especially among French Catholics, and upon his own understanding of the law of Christian brotherly love and the supernatural structure of society.

The purpose of this article is not only to define the interracial attitudes of French Catholics, but also to point to some of their causes, with particular emphasis on those of cultural, philosophical and religious nature.

Before dealing with the specific subject of French Catholic interracialism, it is necessary for two reasons to present a brief picture of interracialism in general throughout the territory of France and her colonies: first, because the majority of French Catholics differ but little from the non-Catholics in this respect; secondly, because the latter participate in the rich heritage of Catholic tradition, which still makes France a Catholic nation in spite of the apostasy of a large part of her population.

At the very outset, it must be stated that the subjects of race, racism, and interracialism are generally foreign to the French mind, and that their discussion tends to create a new problem, where the question is predominantly one of national or local culture, personal temperament, geographical origin and nationality. To these terms do the French reduce most of the elements which, in other lands, are included in the concept of race. A second fundamental fact is that the French are not a race, do not think of themselves as being one, and therefore do not tend to stress racial origin in their definitions of other men. In fact, the traditional government of France made no provisions for or against racial groups as such; civilian and military identification blanks do not request racial information, because it cannot be supplied with scientific accuracy, nor is it of any interest in public life. The same attitude prevails among the people of France; they make a clear distinction between public and private life. Outside the sanctuary of the home and of private lives, com-

plete freedom is assured to every man, in the use of public facilities, choice of residence, employment. The laws for the protection of home labor were not aimed at races but at nationalities. Public life is therefore generally free from racial discrimination and segregation.

This does not mean at all of course that the French are free from prejudices. Within the limited area of private life, prejudices do exist towards groups of an origin, culture, mentality, and race different from the French; but these prejudices will not be suffered openly to control public life. Even in his own private associations, either friendly or marital, a Frenchman will generally consider himself the sole judge of his associations with members of national, racial, or cultural minorities.

The individuals that are objects or victims of prejudice in France may be classified into four groups: first, foreigners, who might be tourists, students, or temporary residents; second, immigrant workers or political refugees; third, Jews of French or foreign nationality; fourth, colonials of color engaged in all types of activity. Although the keenest forms of prejudice are directed at Germans and Jews, this discussion will be limited to the relations between white and colored persons.

In the early 1930's, approximately 35,000 colonials of Negro race or ancestry resided in France: manual laborers, white-collar workers, domestics, students, professional men and women, army soldiers and officers, government officials, unassimilated African subjects and Europeanized West Indian citizens. Towards this minority attitudes vary from distant curiosity to intimate association and complete adoption, the criterion being the degree of physical, moral and cultural assimilation of these colonials to the people and the life of France. Emphatically it must be said that, where this assimilation has been achieved, color has not been a serious obstacle to the successful public and private life of a colonial.

In the colonies the home attitude will prevail between racial groups, wherever the colonial environment closely follows the pattern of French life, as, for example, in the West Indies. But, even in these old French islands, colonization introduces a new factor: the separation or opposition between the governing power and the population governed, and, in the newer colonies between the agents of financial interests and the natives whom they mistreat and sometimes destroy. Racial antagonism, then, cannot be easily distinguished from political, economic and cultural differences. In spite of these

barriers, however, considerable cooperation and association goes on unobstructed, so long as it respects the interests of the powerful and stays within the limits of private life.

To what causes can interracial antipathy and harmony be ascribed?

The most common cause of antipathy is the unfamiliar appearance of a person of color; hence the untiring and irritating curiosity to which he or she is exposed in France. The "How can one be Persian?" of Montesquieu's Parisians is still true. Other causes are racial pride and eugenic preoccupations more frequent among white colonials and the well-to-do class; the fear of the defacement of French culture by inappreciative outsiders; finally, the economic competition of unassimilated groups given to unethical business practices.

The causes for racial tolerance and amity are buried in the old history and culture of France. In spite of the existence of slavery in the colonies, the soil of France has always been exempt from this social scourge, and her society has been characterized by tolerance and sympathetic curiosity. The fantastic racism of Gobineau is a late-comer and stands in sharp contrast to the general humanitarianism and the benevolent cosmopolitanism of his times. The very culture of France seems also to be a climate unfavorable to the development of racism. Its humanism is interested in all varieties of human life, and rejoices in the discovery of both the most peculiar differences of men and the underlying fundamental traits of man; its aestheticism renders it sensitive to beauty in all human forms; its critical rationalism guards it against the superstition of race and the dogma of the white man's superiority and divinely ordered burden; its individualism makes it shun mob opinion, and its classic emphasis on the inner man, on moral problems and the spiritual life causes it to look beyond the outer traits of man, which traits form the better part of the concept of race. Finally, even among the atheistic thinkers of France, there lies a deep belief in the brotherhood of men, in the unity of the human family and the dignity of the human personality, which are the true fruits of centuries of intense authentic Christian life.

The description made above of interracial relations applies to the majority of French people, Catholics and non-Catholics. However, there are certain Catholic elements that have been brought, by accident, vocation or reflection, to a more specific consideration of the

interracial problems. There are the religious missionaries in the colonies and a small group of intellectuals thinking in terms of world-wide brotherhood in Christ. Their approach seems to have followed an evolution including two distinct phases, with the early 1920's serving as a dividing date.

Prior to that time, religious missionaries had for their definite purpose the conversion, religious instruction and eternal salvation of the natives, with little appreciation of the latter's civilization. As teachers, like the lay government educators, they proceeded to instruct their wards in the European ways, producing black or brown French boys and girls, whose ancestors were described, in the textbooks, as being the Gauls, with blonde hair and blue eyes. Hardly is there any interracialism in this relationship, for racial dissimilarity has been superseded by cultural assimilation.

It is interesting to note the response of the natives. Their Europeanization often destroyed the consciousness of their own racial or cultural identity, or relegated it to the private life or native society, when it did not bring about secret or open resistance and rebellion. Another result is that Catholicism was often confused with white European civilization or imperialistic colonization.

After World War I, a new approach was devised among French people in general, under the influence of various contemporary facts. First, among the general causes, was the war migration of colored troops and the post-war influx of students and workers, the vulgarization of African Art and the discovery of Negro American music, the revelations of the International Colonial Exposition of Paris, in 1931, and the spread of the personalistic philosophy with its formal expression of the universal dignity of man at the time of the Ethiopian war.

Second, the Ministry of Colonies in Paris gave a new impetus to the development of the vast reservoirs of natural and human resources of the colonial Empire. The Anthropological Museum of the Trocadéro was inaugurated in Paris, and a new concept of colonization began to influence the training of colonial administrators. For the unrealistic policy of assimilation was substituted the policy of association. The new goal of education in Africa, for instance, was defined as the creation of a Franco-African culture, respectful of the human merits of native civilizations. The phrase "France and her colonies" was replaced by "the French Colonial Empire," "France

of the Five Parts of the World," "France, a nation not of 40, but of 100 million inhabitants."

Simultaneously, Catholic Action was born, introducing social realism into the missions. It appeared important to develop Christians within their native environment and culture, so far as these were compatible with the precepts of Christ. The Vatican policy of the native clergy consecrated the dignity of non-white races in the eyes of the Church. Finally, lay Catholic missionaries were encouraged to go and live their Christian lives among people of other races and civilizations, sincerely adopting the native customs, if they so desired. A native religious art was born, indicating the integration of Christianity in the African and Indo-Chinese cultures.

These new interracial attitudes contain the following implications, for our purpose. First, an important dissociation of the concept of civilization from the concept of European white civilization, and a concomitant dissociation of the concept and the future of Christianity from those of Western or white civilization. Secondly, the idea of the enrichment that may come to human civilization and Christianity from the contributions of other races. Thirdly, the feeling that the variety of races and cultures must be respected as a condition of the actualization of all the potentialities of Christian revelation and life. An auto-critique of European Christendom easily reveals a lack of emphasis upon certain major Christian virtues foreign to the Western or white temperament: for example, evangelical poverty, peace, humility, simplicity and joy. Only the universality of races will, in the minds of these Catholics, bring out every aspect of a universal religion designed by God's wisdom and infinite perspective, and in the Popes' far-flung plans, to encompass and develop all varieties of men. Also the full identity of the Mystical Body of Christ cannot be achieved by one kind of men, however holy they may be. Its completion depends upon the inclusion and its health upon the harmonious communion of all varieties of men, raised to the level of Christian holiness, regardless of their human differences. Finally, it did not appear sufficient to these apostles, that the various branches of the human family be left alone to work out their separate ways to the common meeting point of all souls in Christ. With bold realism they deemed it necessary concretely to establish a human association or communion of races and peoples, where actual daily interracial and international contact supplies for its members the experience of truly universal charity and offers to

the world a model *Catholic* society. "We need you in order to be truly Catholic," cried the white members of the *Ad Lucem* group of Lille and Paris to colored or foreign Catholics. As their motto "*Ad lucem per caritatem*" proclaims, these men and women believe that the practice of interracial charity is, to the individual soul, a source of enlightenment upon the true nature, scope and level of the Christ-life. With a keen understanding of the evolution of world civilization, they also claim that the modern trends of population movements and material progress point to this very same interpenetration of peoples and cultures, and that the willful spiritual cooperation of man is lagging behind the blind forces of nature. Their purpose is, therefore, to endow our closely-knit modern world with its adequate spirituality, which has been superbly forecast and prescribed by Christ, as God alone could.

In conclusion, there is implicit Catholicity in the interracial attitude of the French people in general, while only a few reach deep to the fundamentals of Christian brotherhood. Obviously the latter approach has remained and may well remain a limited symbolic experience. It is, nevertheless, a solution richer in possibilities of perfection for the individual soul, of peaceful settlement of interracial conflicts and of prevention of ultimate racial wars.

The cultural and religious factors of French interracialism are, by their nature and importance, susceptible of application and success in other lands, with proper adaptations. If they were not, we might have to doubt the unity of human nature and the fitness of Christianity to solve human problems. In a war which challenges not only democracy but also Christianity, it is probably through its Christian vitality and veracity that a Christian civilization will be able to remain Christian.

Howard University

The Rural Family Culture Pattern

SISTER ANNE, O.S.B.

A few years ago a social science teacher in a midwest teachers' college thought that no effort should be made to adapt the curriculum of schools to rural needs because he thought that the thing to do was bring rural young people to nearby cities to school. He thought that we were rapidly coming to have one pattern and this trend should be hastened. "Roads, cars, radios have annihilated isolation or barriers or difference for the rural people," was his view.

In a recent issue of *Rural Sociology*, E. T. Hiller reports a study in which the influence of a city upon the surrounding rural area is indicated in terms of population composition and agricultural land value. The summary of this study says, "The distribution of chosen data in successive zones or belts of townships surrounding urban centers is tested for indications of extension of urban influences into rural areas. . . . Characteristic patterns of the data are found surrounding the cities in the sample areas. These patterns indicate clear-cut influences of the cities upon their environs varying, however, with the size of the urban centers. . . ."¹ We are all familiar with this type of study. Its approach and conclusion has become a part of our thinking. We accept the view that the city with its living patterns and attitudes has penetrated into the rural area and its people.

On the contrary, do we often consider the extent to which the city has been influenced by and is still a product of the rural culture pattern of the family brought to it by its rural people? Until quite recently a large percentage of any adult urban audience would have spent their childhood in a rural area or at least have been reared by mothers and fathers with a rural background. The time of rising and retiring, the type of breakfast, the relationships and division of labor in the home, the authority-mutuality-subordination practices, the view of the "good life," were all woven together into the way of life, or the culture pattern. All these small bits of be-

¹ Hiller, E. T., "Extension of Urban Characteristics into Rural Areas," in *Rural Sociology*, September, 1941, p. 242.

havior were as so many vari-colored parts of a mosaic that was laid carefully and cemented firmly into a pattern that has come to be a picture of "the American way" in family life. True, there are regional differences, but there is a marked similarity as well, more apparent perhaps when compared with the family pattern of certain of our immigrant peoples. We know in what way we are different. We admire qualities of self-sufficiency in such phrases as "They have home-made bread" or "She makes all the children's clothes" or "He's a handy man, can fix anything around the house." Likewise we praise the self-sufficiency of our young people when manifested in the controlled independence with which they seek odd jobs in youth, choose their own vocations, and plan their lives. We like these things; they are our way.

The family in the city, even one or two or three generations removed from rural living, continues to follow a good many of these "ways" that make up the rural culture pattern. With an increased premium on space in the cities, demand on the time of mother, father and children, and advertisements in favor of commercial rather than home-fashioned products, the urban family is losing these qualities of self-sufficiency characteristic of "the American way." The rural culture pattern of the family has influenced and still forms the "way" praised in our common speech.

The family as well as other social institutions change and in the process there is danger that some essential elements are lost with the nonessential thus making a later readjustment in society necessary. The nature of man does not change, and the nature of social institutions cannot change or else they will not suit man and his basic needs. Where there is failure to understand the essential nature of man as a person, there will inevitably be failure to understand that warm and protecting shield in which he is nurtured when young and to which he returns when mature for the renewal of his powers through the most intimate strength, joy and peace. Thus the family is the social institution which is at once the natural source of persons and the structure which they build out of the essence of their natures, influenced by their experience and the perspective of their education.

Social institutions are those interdependent organized activities of man around which are grouped the essential interests necessary both for the development of the person and the "more abundant life" of the community. Their structural and relatively permanent

features are the result of the fact that persons at all times and in all places have the same essential natures and interests; thus, these are expressed in very similar ways of life. The relative place of these powerful agencies cannot be left to chance, or completely ignored, or mistaught to children.

Diagraming of dynamic factors is always hazardous, yet there is some clarity which results from thinking of the person as the core of a series of circles. The one lying near the center, which is the person, is the family. The child is born into the family, receives those earliest indelible impressions there, and later in the family he may fulfill that most cherished desire, the perpetuation of his personality in a new person. The circle lying next might be thought of as the Church, the supernatural family, that social institution of which the child becomes a member through Baptism. The institution which holds third place in this series of circles surrounding the person is the school. Thus the social institutions could be indicated in a hierarchical arrangement according to their closeness to the person. Whereas this device does not picture the interdependence of the institutions, it does show a certain order, necessary and unchangeable, if institutions filling more basic needs are not to be replaced by others less able to render the more intimate and essential services to the person.

Today when the rural family culture pattern as contributed to our city populations through migration is changing in such a way that its characteristic self-sufficiency is being gradually abandoned, we might profitably question whether the change is such as will affect the essential nature of the family as a social institution. If it is, man will not be served; persons will be frustrated, and society will experience constant maladjustment until the essential elements are again restored to the structure.

We all recognize the tendency of social institutions more remote from the person to absorb those that are closer to the person. For example, the allocating of intimate services, colorful activities, emotionally valuable experiences to schools may on the surface appear to promote efficiency from the schools' point of view, "more fun" from the child's point of view, or "less bother" from the lazy parents' point of view; but the loss in human values, the loss in growth in spiritual stature to parent and child is irreparable to both the person and society. One cannot expect a child to love or to follow the verbal ideals set before him in a home where nothing happens, where ideals do not pass into action. Food is hastily

poured out of package or can with a minimum of preparation. There is no reason to stay around home in order to see a miraculous transformation take place amidst bustle and aroma. The child goes to watch at the hot-dog stand, at the window where golden-brown waffles are prepared. Reformers, then, busily establish recreation centers "to keep the children off the streets!" Such activity is wholly misguided in towns or cities still capable of normal family life. The absorbing joy of seeing attractive, colorful clothes assemble under the skillful manipulations of an artist-mother have almost disappeared. While learning of this "watching-kind" is taking place, valuable and intimate bonds can be built into lives permanently by casual conversation about the biggest things in life. Social hygiene classes or life guidance personnel would not be necessary if parents were at home for these long hours required in "making things." One does not rush into a discussion of a child's deepest hopes and fears — and they are of real magnitude — without establishing that warm feeling of confidence, "rapport."

It seems obvious that it is in the rural area — small town or open farm — where the home production unit can be a reality,² where the school can direct children's minds and hands toward assisting with these thrilling activities of real construction that fulfill all the requirements of a learning situation, properly motivated. The "whole" child is engaged — head, heart, and hand — while the self-sufficiency in view makes this "project" psychologically, economically, socially, and spiritually sound; it is real. Of course the urban home and school can *try* to create this situation, but they are definitely handicapped from start to finish.

Not only is the concept of the truly functional home being lost in urban areas, but the notion of the superiority of "buying" to "making" is spreading out from the cities in the concentric circles which Mr. Hiller's type of study uses, and it follows the highways according to the "community studies" of Mr. Galpin. As the rural people send their children to replenish our "dying cities" they no longer take with them from their homes the rural family culture pattern of other days from which was fashioned "the American way" of family living.³

² Reynolds, Pauline M. "Lived Nobly and Well," *Cath. Rur. Life Bulletin*, February, 1939, p. 10.

³ It is interesting to note how much home production has been increased among Rehabilitation borrowers, cf. *U. S. Department of Agric. Yearbook*, 1940, p. 876.

Added to many other agencies promoting this flow of activities and functions away from the family, the school of both the rural and the urban area is responsible for a false emphasis contributing to this trend. One ability of man has been quite largely overlooked in educational thought devoted to analyzing man's intellect — the power of knowing, of assimilating unto himself that which is not himself. It is the fact that man can go further than merely knowing the external world; he can use the understanding he has of material things outside himself to fashion, to make, and to combine material things into new shapes and forms. He has thus, over the period of the centuries, brought into being vast realms of material culture, all those material artifacts together with the innumerable and intricate skills necessary for their making. Man is then in a sense creative. He has been said to be a "culture-building animal," and there is no other such animal. This is an essentially human ability and is one in which the rural child excels — in many cases unaided by the school. In an urban environment, making things must be largely school-centered and artificial; apartments are not conducive to carpentry benches, forges, machine-sheds. Learning of this kind could be largely home-centered and truly purposive in the rural area with a beginning made in the school. A real coordination between the family and the school would create a workable concept in the mind of the child of their mutual dependence. This power of carrying out thought into some permanent useful form by fashioning with the hands has largely happened, during all of history, in an effort to enrich family life, to fill its needs beautifully. Making things has been part of our rural family culture pattern, and with the passing of this culture trait comes the present dearth in skilled workmen.

Whereas it is quite right to insist on the fact that "the proper end of the intellect is truth," it is extremely important to go further and insist that truth can not only be comprehended but is capable of being expressed in acts and in material forms. When man does this, he is in a sense like unto God, a creator. Could any finer hope be placed before the child in school and home as an incentive to work than his sharing in God's nature? Yet, has not the emphasis in our schools been for the most part upon the abstracting ability of the mind, rather than (in public schools) upon the acting ability of the will, or (in Catholic schools) upon the creating ability of the hands?

This is not merely a theoretical notion; it has potent repercussions when the child returns home from school with his head filled with the idea of the superiority of "book-learning" over the work of body and hand. This false view of the person is seen in our multitude of white-collared proletariat who prefer that they and their families should suffer from continuous malnutrition⁴ than that they or any member of their family should soil their hands with keeping a garden, milking a cow, washing the clothes, baking the bread, or canning grape jelly. It is thought to be more in keeping with man's dignity to buy these goods and services than to acquire them through the work of body and hand. These tasks, nevertheless, when accomplished with accuracy and artistry are a greater challenge to the "whole" man than a vast amount of the routine tasks performed by the industrial employee or the office clerk. Further, the non-money receipts from such tasks keep the living level up in times of depression.⁵ Our schools share in the responsibility for this condition because of their over-emphasis on the head and under-emphasis on the heart and hand. This has led to the disappearance of the sound virtues of home-production and family self-sufficiency before the barrage of commercial advertising with its emphasis on artificial "niceness" and pale white hands. This basic institution, foundational to the whole societal structure, has, like Topsy, "just growed," not been reared. The schools have been willing to let family values be a by-product, largely untaught, unplanned.

Colleges throughout the country may aid in changing this thought-trend, as they aided in making it.⁶ The factual data being piled up by empirical studies cry out for interpretation in urban and rural sociology classes. The handwriting on the wall is the same for both; it says that every social problem is ultimately caused by some failure in the family. Social reformers have spent thousands, millions of dollars on agencies that they think can substitute for the family, can replace the family. As sociologists we insist that sound social theory is a prerequisite for sound social reform. As Catholics we might begin our social credo with the words "I believe in the family."

* U. S. Dept. of Agriculture Yearbook, 1939, p. 34 and pp. 303-308.

* U. S. Dept. of Agriculture Yearbook, 1940, p. 850.

Cf. also School of Living Research Bulletins, Suffern, New York.

* Nutting, Willis D., "The Catholic College and the Land," *Cath. Rur. Life Bulletin*, November, 1938, p. 2.

The essential theory, then, in both rural and urban sociology classes is that the family cannot permit the delegation of any large number of its functions and services. The family must be placed next to the person because it must be primary in fact. It is primary in theory due to the divine command to continue the race and the human need for a society where love is acknowledged to have first place. We have given lip-service to this basic and beautiful doctrine, but we have insisted on no practical measures for its continuance. These ends of the family cannot be fulfilled in a vacuum. Just as the person needs a sufficiency of things for virtuous action⁷ so, too, the family must have at its command such tools, equipment, property, as make it relatively independent of the community. This means, there must be a functional home where the members' needs are met for close companionship, for opportunities to excel, for training in wisdom, for food, clothing and shelter of a satisfying kind or at least of "reasonable and frugal comfort,"⁸ for security against tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow.

Perhaps the teacher from that midwest teachers' college is right — and wrong. Perhaps we do not need a different curriculum for urban and rural areas. That is, we need more emphasis and practical teaching for the techniques of worthy home membership in town and country, that the self-sufficiency of the rural family culture pattern may continue to be "the American way."

Saint Cloud, Minn.

⁷ St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Reginime Principium*, Bk. I, Ch. 15.
⁸ Pope Leo XIII, *The Condition of Labor*.

The Family Under the National Defense Program

EDWIN C. MULLIGAN, S.J.

The observations in this article will be confined to the study of the effects of the defense program on a small industrial city in the East — York, Pennsylvania. Its population is 56,000. It is small in area, thus facilitating investigation, and its armament orders run close to \$100,000,000. Thus, in general, it can serve as a pattern for the effect on the social life of the nation of defense demands.

The figures presented as indicative of the social changes affecting the community of York are taken from an article in the *New York Times* (January 16, 1941). They were gathered by a *Times* reporter who spent three weeks among the people of York. He divided his survey under the following headings: relief, retail business, housing, auto sales, crime, labor, and amusements. Through interviews with industrialists, retail merchants, workers, the chief of police, and the head of the family bureau, his data were gathered and the changes noted. The survey was not lengthy, but the figures are sufficiently accurate to indicate the trend and importance of the social changes taking place. They create an interesting field of study for the inductive sociologists; and for the social engineer or social planner, they pose some vexing problems of social adjustment under the impact of a nation at war.

Specifically, I am concerned with the family. And the changes occurring in the York community, as outlined in the headings of the survey, directly or indirectly affect family life. Any important social change records itself in the family group. Witness the effect on family mores of the auto, mechanical household appliances, mass education, and other marvels of our industrial age.

What were some of the startling changes revealed in this survey?

Relief: In 1939 the W.P.A. employed 2,800 men; in 1940 the number employed was 1,800. Other figures reveal that the number of individuals on relief rolls had declined at the end of June by more than two-thirds. This decline has continued.

Industrial Wages: Pay rolls were one-third greater in 1940 than the previous year. At the end of June, 1941, pay rolls were 75%

greater, and industrial employment had increased almost 40%. This economic prosperity enabled some families, previously unemployed, to pay old debts, and has also resulted in a feeling of encouragement.

Retail Business: Sales showed an upward swing. Department stores reported that women were buying more of everything. Three department stores expanded their floor space. Biggest sales were in durable goods and household supplies. Evidently many families were in need of these commodities, and the present boom supplied the purchasing power.

Auto Sales: Many used cars, on hand for months, were sold.

Housing: Although 65% of the people live in the homes they own, there is an acute housing shortage. The situation is particularly acute in the lowest income group, where rent increases have affected the only housing available to poorly paid laborers. In the so-called alley houses the increase has been from \$12 to \$15 and from \$15 to \$18. In more desirable dwellings, from \$25 to \$30. According to R. T. Thomas of the York Family Service Bureau, it is difficult to secure places for evicted families. Figures on the migration of labor are not available. The brunt of the immigration was expected in the summer of 1941. That this expected labor importation had added to the already accentuated housing shortage, can be seen from an item in the *York Dispatch* (December 2, 1941) which quotes the York City and County Council of Defense to the effect that "the shortage of housing has become acute, seriously threatening the York defense program." And further, "the demand continues as additional workers are moving into York or are seeking accommodations closer to the plants in which they are employed."

Crime: There has been an increase in the total crimes committed; the syphilis rate has doubled. In 1940 there were 792 arrests for drunkenness as compared with 649 arrests in 1939. The greatest problem, according to Chief of Police Gerber, comes from the youth between the ages of 14 to 18. Within this age group there is an increasing number of offenders.

Labor: The York Safe and Lock Co., the largest employer of labor in the city, increased its force from 325 employees in September, 1938, to more than 1,600 in September, 1941, working two ten-hour shifts a day, six days a week. This winter there should be about 5,000 men on the pay roll. Today, this highly specialized firm is devoted almost completely to armament production; only

5% of its present business is in safes and vaults. There is a shortage of skilled labor, but not nearly so acute as in other defense centers. York has had a widely diversified metal working industry and many small machine shops, where skilled workers have been trained for years.

The above social changes give rise to some questions pertinent to the status of the family today.

Has the tremendous upsurge in industry created any new problems for the modern family, or does it merely emphasize and crystallize the old ones? Will our war effort tend to socialize the present family into a more stable unit, or will it further the modern trend of family disintegration? Will the family suffer further losses in its natural functions by the encroachments of government agencies, under the necessity of national defense? Will the intra-family relationships, so loosened by our contractual type of family structure, be strengthened by the war effort? With the billions being spent to protect our country from the enemy without, is there any provision for the strengthening of the family group, the unit of social and national safety? What measures could be taken by local and national authorities to cushion the postwar economic let-down?

These questions, among others, naturally propose themselves as the survey reveals the changes effected by the war effort in the York Community. I do not say that the data supply an answer to these questions. Each industrial city has its own specific conditions and problems. It would be rash to generalize from the data found in York and apply the results to all our industrial centers. One must consider the background of the community and the kind of people who comprise it. Family unity and stability have deeper roots than mere economic growth. Family culture and morale are the products of tradition and custom, where the mobility rate is not excessive. York's background has been primarily agricultural. Its people are steeped in that tradition. York and Lancaster are among the wealthiest agricultural counties in the country. York has held its own against the development of industry. The Pennsylvania Dutch, descendants of the old German pioneers, are unsurpassed in all America as tillers of the soil. Such a tradition stabilizes the family institution and stiffens its resistance to any disintegrating forces in the defense effort. Because of this background, I think York is better equipped to meet the severe changes in family adjustment than many other American cities are.

Similar studies made in larger American cities reveal similar trends where the impact of defense orders has been felt. Family life is subjected to the same factors. This has been borne out in a recent article in *Fortune Magazine* (September, 1941). In it we read of Bridgeport, Connecticut, a defense boom town, where 26,000 workers are making shells, guns, etc. Another article in the *New York Times* (November 2, 1941) points out that a similar situation prevails in Hartford, Connecticut, which is enjoying a tremendous defense boom.

How will the family adjust itself in these defense boom centers? Can we evaluate the influence on the family structure of these similar forces bearing on the family life of our nation? There is more purchasing power in the hands of our people, but is there any more economic security? Does the family feel more secure today than it did previous to the defense boom? The single major factor of family tensions and disruption, resulting from the lack of sufficient economic income (testimony by Isador Lubin, U. S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics, reveals that 87 per cent of the families in the U. S. have incomes of less than 1250 dollars a year) still faces the majority of American families. Family income has been upped, it is true, but higher prices and taxes will quickly absorb the surplus. Economic security in the form of land ownership or business ownership or a steady job is a bulwark for family growth and stability. Many a worker today who is boring a gun or plating a tank is wondering what will become of his job when the war is over. Many today realize that the economic boom is only a shot in the arm, stimulating while it lasts, but leaving an awful headache on the morrow.

From the economic changes we are led to the more important and far less measurable factors of family ideology and family values. Family values have suffered a decline in this country as the prevalence of divorce, the spirit of individualism and the frustration of the end and natural purposes of marriage bear witness. Will the war effort help to restore the former true values? Will the spirit of the classic war slogan, for our homes and our country, be a bond of family unity? Will the spirit of sacrifice grip the family members to subordinate individual pleasure and interest to the common good? How many look on this war effort with the enthusiasm and bravery of one defending the sanctity and safety of his home? If you can convince Americans of this, we should have a tremendous unifying force. It

is all summed up in the word "morale." Has the war effort inspired American families into one great national family, fighting for its life?

What of the future? It was recently reported in the papers that 2,000,000 women might be drafted for defense work. Figures are not available for the number of women now engaged in defense industries. What will be the effect of such an action on the children of the future? If the war drags on, will the family feel again that terrible state of war weariness, so deadly in 1918 on family life and the consequent collapse of morals in the postwar period? Will the people face again a period of disillusionment?

The family safety and its welfare is a paramount issue to the nation in this defense crisis. The problems engendered by the defense program together with already existing factors of family tensions and insufficiency of income still threaten the establishment of a permanent basis for family unity and stability.

With the nation now actually at war, the bonds of family unity will be strengthened. Where previously many could say this is not our war, now when subjected to a vicious attack on their lives, all Americans can rally to a common cause. All families will now sense the need of sacrifice. The classic war cry, for homes and country, may inspire Americans to subordinate personal pleasure to the common goal of victory. The family should feel this unifying force. Blood and sweat and tears given for the life of one's country may unite a family where ease and pleasure and selfishness have dissolved it.

St. Joseph's College

The Sociology of Human Relations in Industry

RUDOLPH J. SCHWENGER

The industrial plant as a subject of sociology has been a rather neglected field until recently, though industry with all its related problems has undoubtedly been of decisive importance in modern social life. Our society is to a great extent an industrial society, and the industrial plant as a productive and social unit is of basic importance to our economic society and our whole present-day social life. It is, therefore, not easy to understand why a sociology of human relations in industry, or shorter, industrial sociology as a special branch of sociology, has hardly been established though we have, for example, a well-developed rural sociology. We have of course a certain number of publications in this field, but what we miss is a comprehensive systematic study. This article will attempt to give in a very condensed form an outline of such a study.

What is meant by "industrial sociology"? We can define it as the science of industrial society or, in other words, the science dealing with groups formed and determined in their social relations and interactions by industry. The subject matter of industrial sociology is the industrial plant as a social institution. An industrial plant is a systematic cooperation of a group equipped with technical apparatus and coordinated in time and space. The industrial plant is not only an organization of the technical means of production based on economic considerations but also at the same time a social structure of specific unity with a specific social purpose. This purpose is to secure the existence and continuity of the plant as a specific social structure. Industry (I am using this term always in the sense of industrial plant) can be looked at from three aspects, a technical, an economic, and a social aspect. Though we are concerned only with the last one, it is well to note that all three are intimately connected. This is of great importance for a methodical approach to a sociological study of industry.

There is no doubt that the plant is a social order by itself. This proves the fact that all industrial plants have certain characteristics

in common. They have an established authority, a certain hierarchy of functions, a necessary discipline, a division of labor, and cooperation. These characteristics are indispensable and essential for the existence of every plant to whatever economic system it may belong. The industrial plant, therefore, is not an appendage of capitalism. Business enterprise and industrial plant must be clearly distinguished. While the business enterprise is an intrinsic part of the capitalistic system, the plant as such is an extra-historical institution. There were factories before the modern factory system was established.

What are the different social phenomena of the industrial plant? A satisfying study cannot confine itself to the mere intra-plant social relations and processes. The plant is not an isolated social unit but is influenced by its environment and in turn radiates its influence upon the surrounding community and society at large. Three groups of problems, therefore, face the sociologist: the environment of the industrial unit, the social phenomena within industry, and the reaction of social conditions in industry upon society.

The environment of the industrial plant. We include in this term the whole of environmental influences, that is, geographical, social, economic, and mental influences. All members of an industrial group are subjected to numerous influences of outside social conditions since they are at the same time members of and related to society at large. They belong to families, neighborhood groups, communities, religious and political groups. Standards of conduct, belief, and expression have been impressed upon them. Of influence also is the whole stratification of society. Rigid class distinctions as they exist in some European countries are easily transferred into the plant and applied to intra-plant relations. In a genuinely democratic country like America this particular problem hardly exists since everybody is conscious of having equal opportunities and equal rights.

The location of a plant is also important. A plant in an over-crowded, industrial and urban region lacks comradeship and cooperation and becomes a center of social unrest. The rural area, on the other hand, strengthens the industrial community, stabilizes its labor force and fosters tradition. A wholesome contact with rural life and its culture is also established.

Finally, we have to include also all the active intervention of outside agencies such as labor unions, employers' associations and political groups. It is especially the government, which, by means

of social legislation and labor law, tends to participate more actively in industrial relations thus encroaching more and more upon the once relatively autonomous industrial sphere. In some European countries, especially after the first World War, in Germany, social legislation became not only a regulative power but also a method of socialization, that is to say, that step by step the government assumed the responsibility for all industrial relations, thus making the plant almost a public domain. The consequence was that the workmen felt themselves exponents of outside agencies and interest groups rather than members of an integrated industrial community.

The social phenomena in industry itself. We will consider them from a twofold aspect: (a) from a static aspect considering the social relations in industry which, bound together, form the industrial social structure, and (b) from a dynamic aspect, considering the social processes in industry.

(a) *Social relations:* There are two types of social relationships, cooperation and co-ordination. The forms of cooperation are different in a small or medium-sized plant and different under large-scale production. Mass production and mechanization do not allow purely personal relationships and make a rational organization and standardization of interhuman relationships a necessity. As a consequence the social distance and the estrangement of the cooperating persons is increased, and the intimate contact of the homogeneous group of a small shop disappears.

Inseparably connected with industrial cooperation is the co-ordination of cooperating persons. While cooperation represents the horizontal line of social relations, co-ordination shows the vertical line. The industrial plant is, as we shall see, not only a cooperating unit but requires also a directing and co-ordinating power and authority. This authority is represented by management. Closely connected with this authority is a well-defined hierarchy of functions. By this term we mean the different degrees of subordination and superordination in an industrial plant. Industrial hierarchy is not determined by any personal dependencies but is mainly determined by technical necessities. This distinguishes it from any social stratification. Hierarchy becomes a problem when it exceeds those objective requirements. For example, an over-expansion results in a bureaucracy of interhuman relations, thus creating an administrative machinery and lessening individual initiative.

Related to industrial hierarchy is shop discipline. Its purpose is the integration and co-ordination of all members of the plant according to certain rules and comprehensive planning. Different degrees of divisions of labor and forms of production require different forms and intensities of shop discipline. The more sensitive the process of production is to all kinds of disturbances, the stricter the discipline will be. It is more strict where the dangers of accidents are greater (as in coal mines), or where precise teamwork is required (as in a rolling mill). All these are forms of shop discipline imposed not from outside, but the outcome of objective situations and technological factors. We call this form of discipline "organic discipline," which is acknowledged and accepted as a necessity by the workers. On the other hand, we find sometimes another form of shop discipline, resented and rejected by the employees, the arbitrary discipline which is imposed upon them. This kind of discipline is not limited by the requirements of cooperation and production but makes the employees personally dependent on management.

To solve the problems of the proper hierarchy and discipline, a great deal of experimenting has been done. In 1875 the Catholic French industrialist Léon Harmel tried to realize the idea of a "Christian Factory" by establishing so-called "secondary authorities" in the form of shop committees in his plant with the aim of decentralizing responsibility, authority and discipline in a more democratic way. Another more modern solution was tried by Bata in his shoe factory in Czechoslovakia. He built up an organization of autonomous workshops with self-administration and self-budgeting co-ordinated to a general management. Well known is the American plan of regional decentralization which I shall only mention.

We shall not conclude this part of our paper dealing with social relations in industry without also touching upon the historical approach to them. No doubt, the whole social structure of the plant, its social relations, its forms of discipline and its exertion of authority are to a great extent shaped by certain dominating historical forces. The crystallization of certain political and cultural patterns is a social frame work which we can call the industrial constitution. It reflects different forms of government, different philosophies of life, and even religious influences. We see that in our time revolutionary political and social changes are reflected in corresponding transformations of the industrial constitution. In Germany alone we had in relatively quick succession three forms of industrial constitution.

Before the first World War industrial relations reflected the rigid class distinctions of that time. In addition, the industrial plant was organized according to military patterns, applying the Prussian militaristic ideology to the industrial sphere. After the World War the communistic revolution in Russia was reflected in Germany by the official introduction of the system of shop council (*Betriebsrat*). Finally, under the Nazi regime the so-called leadership principle was adopted by industry and made the official form of industrial organization.

Going back into history we find industrial paternalism as the dominating form in the first half of the 19th century. Here the model is the patriarchal family. The entrepreneur is the only responsible head of the industrial family, sometimes even intervening in the private life of his employees. Later on economic liberalism had its appropriate industrial constitution, surviving partly until today. It did not recognize a social sphere of its own in industry and rejected any social obligation beyond the wage contract. Industrial relations were reduced to economic relations, and labor was considered a factor of production alone. Finally, there are the different forms of industrial democracy trying to apply the democratic principle to industry.

(b) *Social processes.* The second group of social phenomena comprises the social processes in industry. We have to distinguish between two main groups of social processes. First the regular or normal social processes, which are the outgrowth of a well adjusted industrial social order, represent a harmonious functioning of inter-human relations indispensable for a sound social structure. They are the expression of that right relationship which respects the rights of each and is called "order" by Saint Augustine, who says, "Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place." This right relationship implies also peace, industrial peace in our case, based on social justice.

But such a perfect functioning of social processes is not always the rule. In reality we find many deviations from the proper and orderly functioning of social processes. We call this second group the irregular social processes or the social processes of frictions and tensions. They are the result of human inadequacies and conflicts within the social hierarchy — in the vertical line between management and worker, or in the horizontal line among the fellow-workers because of the lack of cooperation. Besides this, a lack of co-

ordination causes frictions and tensions within the whole social and technical sphere. A onesided "dictate" of technology becomes a threat to a sound social order. Frictions in regard to the economic sphere derive for the most part from an overemphasis on certain economic viewpoints, for example, intensification of labor, wage incentives, etc. They are the major causes of social unrest and distrust.

All social processes, regular and irregular, produce a certain industrial atmosphere which is typical of each industrial establishment. It is a collective characteristic and refers to the state of mind of the whole group of employees. Industrial atmosphere represents the collective attitude towards work, towards management, and towards the whole composite of conditions defining the workers' relationship to the plant. Thus the positive or negative attitude of the group finds its expression, on the one hand, in a spirit of confidence and cooperation and, on the other hand, in distrust and obstruction. All social processes are to a great extent determined by the industrial atmosphere which is not only the result and outcome of social processes but is also itself a directing, moulding power giving social processes their interpretation and "flavor."

The radiation of industrial social phenomena upon society at large. At this point we need only to mention that industry with its particular social conditions influences its social environment and society at large. The particular form of social structure, the type of industrial constitution, the prevailing industrial atmosphere, conditions of social equilibrium or social unrest, the stability or mobility of the labor force are not without consequences in the field of human relationships outside the plant. Tensions and conflicts in industry which are caused by a maladjusted industrial life expand beyond the limits of the immediate environment of the plant into society. Thus, a socially maladjusted industry becomes a center of social unrest. This industrial unrest easily becomes political unrest of a dangerous and explosive character. Different social and political movements have had their origin in industry whether they aimed at social reforms or at an overthrowal of the present socio-economic system.

As we have seen, the unity of the industrial group and its integrity is threatened by different processes of social disintegration, friction and social inadequacy. An integrated social structure is not only the presumption of a well organized process of production but has

its inherent right of existence to preserve the stability and social unity of the group.

Any social group has some means of accommodating its members to one another, some means of social control. This is especially true of industry. This control dealing with the specific social problems in industry has two functions: the control of intra-plant relations and the control of extra-plant relations. The first one is exercised by personnel management. Its aim is the co-ordination (in an *active* sense) of all the members of an industrial group, the betterment of intra-plant relations and their adaption to the technical and economic ends of production, and the establishment of a proper balance between the technical and the social organization. In this respect personnel management is a management of persons in relation to things.

The second form of social control is the industrial social service, in Europe known as industrial social policy. Though mostly included in personnel management, it is better distinguished as a separate form. It is concerned with the extra-plant relationships of the members of the industrial group and their families, their social, physical and economic well-being outside the process of production. This policy recognizes the fact that the employee is not only a factor of production but also his status as a human personality. It involves the consideration of his concrete human and social situation with all its environmental implications and his needs of health and economic security.

It was in the field of industrial social service that social initiative first developed different forms of social welfare activities. Social legislation had its origin, to a great extent, in such advanced experiments initiated by the social needs of industry. Industrial social policy should not be a substitute but a supplement to social legislation. There are certain problems which can be solved by industry alone, namely, those which are intimately connected with particular conditions in a given plant. Industry must shoulder a reasonable share of responsibility and should never be entirely relieved of this burden by the state. Industrial social service, endowed with a measure of autonomy can certainly be very efficient due to its elasticity and adaptability to the local and particular plant conditions, its individualization of methods, and its smaller domain which can be more easily and satisfactorily controlled. An example of the greater socio-economic efficiency of industrial social policy as opposed to

state management is the functioning of industrial sickness funds in many European countries. They are an example of social insurance on an occupational basis and, as investigation has proved, far superior to the working of the central funds system of the government. Industrial social policy can, when properly organized, show the way to an occupational and functional order in the meaning of *Quadragesimo Anno*. Industry should be given its natural share of self-government in the social field, which must, of course, be shared by labor. All tasks which can be fulfilled by these bodies should be transferred to them. This kind of decentralization of functions is the only guarantee against the threat of an all-embracing totalitarian state.

St. Michael's College



NEWS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

Approximately 300 delegates representing 85 colleges and institutions registered for the fourth convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society held at the Hotel Astor, December 28-30, 1941.

The business meeting of the Society, held on December 29, elected as members of the executive-council for 1941:

Honorary President, The Most Rev. Edwin V. O'Hara, D.D., Bishop of Kansas City, Missouri

Executive Council: Walter L. Willigan, St. John's University, Brooklyn, N. Y., President; Helen M. Toole, College of New Rochelle, New Rochelle, N. Y., Vice-President; Rev. Ralph A. Gallagher, S. J., Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, Executive-Secretary; Sister Mary Liguori, B.V.M., Mundelein College, Chicago, Illinois, Treasurer; Frank T. Flynn, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana; Rev. Francis J. Friedel, S.M., University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio; Rev. Paul Hanly Furfey, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.

Upon the acceptance of a motion by Sister Anne, O.S.B., that a committee be appointed to formulate an amendment to the constitution to set up two types of membership within the American Catholic Sociological Society, President Walter Willigan appointed a committee composed of Sister Anne, O.S.B. (chairman), Rev. Vincent McQuade, O.S.A., and Sister M. Henry, O.P., to consider this amendment and report to the executive-council. The treasurer's report was made by the Rev. Ralph A. Gallagher, S.J., in the absence of Mr. Joseph A. Walsh, who resigned early in the year.

The financial statement of the American Catholic Sociological Society from December 15, 1940, to December 15, 1941, is as follows:

Receipts

Balance from the year 1940	\$109.20
1941 Subscriptions to REVIEW	181.94
1941 Membership Dues	648.50
Miscellaneous income	5.30
	\$944.94

*Expenditures **

Postage	\$125.66
Office expenses, mimeographing, supplies, telephone, telegrams	59.19
Printing, stationery, REVIEW	532.50
Clerical Work	75.00
Miscellaneous expenses	16.80
Cash on Hand, December 15, 1941	135.79
	\$944.94

* The expenditures do not include the cost of printing the December, 1941, issue of the REVIEW and the 1941 convention expenses. The payment of these two items leaves the finances of the Society in a very precarious state. For this reason members of the Society are requested to remit their 1942 dues as soon as possible.

The convention accepted unanimously the following report of the resolutions committee headed by the Rev. Vincent McQuade, O.S.A.:

I. Be it resolved: that the ACSS express its sincere appreciation for the work of all those who have contributed to the success of the fourth annual convention, and express its thanks in particular to the officers of the Society, to the members of the local reception committee, to the students of nearby colleges who generously assisted in the conduct of the meetings, and to the speakers for their contributions.

II. Whereas, an infamous and cowardly attack has been perpetrated on the United States and thus forced war upon this country, and

Whereas, the Axis powers, Germany and Italy, through their aggression, outrages, and actions have likewise forced war upon this country,

Be it resolved: that the members of the ACSS pledge their services and aid to the country during this period of national emergency, obliging themselves to do all in their power to bring the conflict to a quick and successful termination.

III. Whereas, the statements of Pope Pius XII on peace have urged Catholics to take a leading role in formulating the principles and basis of a lasting peace, and

Whereas, it is necessary to initiate such programs as would inculcate and disseminate these principles, and

Whereas, sociologists should exert an important control on the agencies formulating public opinion in this country,

Be it resolved: that the members of the ACSS will exert their efforts and energies in propagating and popularizing the principles of a just and lasting peace as proposed by Pope Pius XII.

IV. Whereas, past experiences have shown that civil liberties are frequently ignored during war periods, and

Whereas, unjust, unconstitutional restrictions are frequently imposed during such periods,

Be it resolved: that the members of the ACSS will strive to defend and protect the civil liberties of citizens and others who reside in this country.

Be it resolved: that the members of the ACSS will strive to foster and promote those attributes and viewpoints which will clearly objectify the issues involved in the conflict, strive to uncover and reveal deceitful propaganda, and while encouraging patriotism, yet, hinder and obstruct a jingoistic Americanism which is detrimental to the country's welfare and logically subscribes to the tenets of state absolutism.



Frank T. Flynn of the University of Notre Dame is teaching during the current semester a course at the University of Chicago on the "Social Treatment of Crime."



The National Conference of Social Work will be held in New Orleans, La., from May 10-16. Subjects for discussion at the general sessions are: The Place of Social Work in National Defense, Economic and Social Progress and Problems of the South, Social Work Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, Post-War Problems, Responsibility of Social Work in a Democracy.



Percy A. Robert of the Catholic University of America was recently elected president of the District of Columbia chapter of the American Sociological Society.



The National Catholic Conference on Family Life announces its annual essay contest for students in Catholic colleges and universities. Subject matter is any topic that relates "definitely to the home or family life." There are fourteen prizes. Closing date for the contest is May 1.

Further details for the contest may be secured by writing to the National Catholic Conference on Family Life, 1312 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.



St. John's University, Brooklyn, is again sponsoring a "School of Social Action" which offers free evening courses for adults on a variety of social subjects of practical and theoretical interest.

In the replies received in answer to a request for news notes most sociology departments indicated that their present schedules were orientated towards the present defense program. Courses relating to the problems of national defense were many, and some institutions, like the College of Notre Dame of Maryland, have begun a group project of a study of Latin-American culture. In general, it seems that, from the notices received, sociology departments are retaining their basic curriculums and are offering in addition certain specialized courses related to the national defense program.

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Creighton University, under the direction of the Rev. John C. Rawe, S.J., has inaugurated an Institute of Rural Life designed to assist farmers in the intelligent operation of agricultural lands and homes. During the course of a twelve-month term Father Rawe, two other teachers and a group of students will live on and use the facilities of a 220 acre research farm near Elkhorn, Nebraska. There, stress will be laid on diversified, bio-dynamic farming, the operation of self-supporting homes, soil conservation, etc.

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The Rev. Vincent C. Dore, O.P., of Providence College has been named chairman of the minimum wage board for restaurants and hotel-restaurants in the State of Rhode Island.

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At the annual meeting of the American Association of the Schools of Social Work, held in Pittsburgh, Pa., on January 29-31, the Rev. Walter McGuinn, S.J., Dean of the Boston College School of Social Work, was elected to the Executive Committee of the Association.

The April issue of *Caritas*, quarterly publication of the students and graduates of the Boston College School of Social Work, will be a war issue with articles on the relationship of social work training and the present war effort.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PAUL J. MUNDIE, Book Review Editor
Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Handbook of Sociology. By Edward Byron Reuter. New York:
Dryden Press. 1941. Pp. viii and 233. \$1.50

This is a volume for student use, to supplement the text in use in class, and contains four parts. Part One deals with "Conceptions of Sociology," Part Two with "Summary of Essentials," Part Three with a "Dictionary of Terms," and Part Four with "Areas of Specialized Study."

This book has an excellent purpose. The author complains that students often come to the end of their study of sociology with little or no real understanding of the discipline. He complains that the introductory course gives the student no basic frame of reference, and that the subsequent specialized courses do not give any orderly system of knowledge, and that the end result tends to give extensive and unwieldy knowledge rather than coherent and profound knowledge. This difficulty is no doubt present in much current teaching of sociology. The author proposes to remedy this by putting in the hands of the student a small volume outlining the framework of modern sociology theory, by giving a brief dictionary of terms used in the science, and lastly by presenting brief sketches of the subject matter and methodology of some twenty-two so-called areas of specialized study. Unfortunately, this excellent purpose is not achieved.

In Part One, dealing with "Conceptions of Sociology," Dr. Reuter discusses the rise of folk sociology, of 19th century and 20th century welfare sociology, and attempts to define and delimit sociology as a scientific discipline. While the reviewer believes that it is highly desirable to differentiate between welfare sociology and a science of sociology, it cannot be said that this has been done in this book in a way acceptable to any Christian. The author states that "sociology is the ethically neutral study of group life and group behavior." This reviewer is unable to comprehend the phrase "ethically neutral."

In Part Two, which is a "Summary of Essentials," the Catholic particularly will be distressed by the author's complete espousal of the worst features of Malthusianism and neo-Malthusianism. This reviewer has not read anywhere in any book published in the

last ten years such a group of completely unproved and unprovable statements as the author makes in the two pages devoted to this subject. For a man who for years has criticized any sociology that was not entirely based on laboratory and statistical evidence, it seems almost humorous to find him making this statement, ". . . contraceptive knowledge is one of the half dozen great human discoveries; it is perhaps equal in importance to the discovery of fire or the invention of language." Later on, Dr. Reuter explains human nature. He says that it is "in no sense an original endowment." The net result of this point is that we are born animals and we acquire our humanity from interaction with other people. There is little point in further outlining the general approach in this part. Dr. Reuter uses a lot of terms to explain why we act the way we act. And, since he concludes that with society as it is we must act the way we act, it almost seems as if all the terms have no meaning.

The "Dictionary of Terms" is a section devoted to brief statements explaining terms commonly used in sociology. This is probably the best part of the book, although many of the statements are uncritical or give one explanation of the term when several are in common use, or finally, give too brief an explanation.

The last part of the book, dealing with "Areas of Specialized Study," gives a brief description of a number of specialized courses in sociology. The reviewer believes the statement of each field to be too brief to be useful to the student.

PAUL J. MUNDIE

Marquette University

The Social Life of Primitive Man. By Sylvester A. Sieber, S.V.D., and Franz H. Mueller. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co. 1941.
Pp. xiii and 566. \$3.50

In contrast with many other highly colored and somewhat over-drawn publications in the field of cultural anthropology, the present description of social origins is characterized by a soberness and restraint well calculated to beget confidence in the reader. Very decidedly it veers away from the evolutionary trends that too long have dominated sociological study and made prehistory the playground of arbitrary theorizing. Whilst this tendency is yielding to a saner and more realistic outlook, it still persists, especially in the popular literature on the subject, for though, as Robert H. Lowe remarks, many of the earlier speculations about primitive society belong on the scrapheap of science, they are occasionally picked up again by some ardent champion of cultural evolution and dressed to look like new.

The volume under review may be considered in two ways, first as a factual exposition of ascertainable data and secondly as a philosophical interpretation of the material gathered from a great variety of sources. Viewed under the first aspect the volume is likely to meet with fairly general approval by ethnologists of the conservative

type. In this respect, there appears to be much common ground on which the existing historical schools can agree and cooperate. What counts in this connection is the conviction shared by these schools that even the most primitive state of mankind exhibits the earmarks of a genuinely human society and of true culture. The question here after all is chiefly one of facts, once a common stock of facts is accepted other differences become of slighter importance.

As a picture of the social life of primitive man the book possesses distinct value irrespective of any theories to which it is committed. In English it has no equivalent and will render excellent service as an introductory text to the study of sociology. It will familiarize the student with the essential structure of society and the social institutions which in their essential features are coeval with man. The arrangement of the topics indicates the progress from simpler to more complicated forms of association. We are introduced to the real Primitives who live in the food-gathering stage; the primary cultures, comprising pastoral nomads, horticulturists and higher hunters, and the secondary cultures combining elements of the previous cultures. In these different social environments the varying fortunes of the family, government and property are traced, and the causes of their growth and decline set forth. The social aspects of primitive life are stressed whilst other phenomena such as religion, education and morality are sketched in lightly and only to the extent required for the understanding of the general cultural setting. This rather inadequate summary suggests nevertheless the rich contents of the book and its usefulness for purposes of study.

We enter on disputed territory when we take cognizance of the methodological and interpretative aspects of the volume before us because it brings us face to face with the culture circle theory (*Kulturreislehre*), to which American ethnologists are not particularly partial. No amount of mere facts can satisfy the inherent desire of human reason for unification and classification. In this desire for unity reason sometimes proceeds in an arbitrary fashion and imposes artificial patterns on the unorganized mass of material. Possibly the culture cycle theory is not free from subjective construction, but it works as a hypothesis and explains both the unity of culture complexes and the diffusion of culture throughout the world. Postulating a limited number of centers from which culture radiates it is able to account as well for the diversity of cultural expressions as the thread of unity that runs through all cultural complexes and be-speaks a basic relationship. We would hardly claim that all similar manifestations call for a common historical source, for it is obvious that identical forms may have arisen independently of each other and that their similarity is due to convergence. Still though convergence can be the cause of similarities it cannot be erected into a principle of general application. Admitting that the culture circle theory has considerable plausibility, we cannot but feel that its simplifications at times seem a little strained. However this may

be, the scholarly volume will advance the study of cultural anthropology and introduce it to wider circles. One of its aims is to make the extensive research work of Father Wilhelm Schmidt and his school better known and appreciated. That this be accomplished is eminently desirable for, whether the ingenious theory eventually prove right or wrong, it has aroused keen interest in ethnology as a key to prehistory and stimulated inquiry in that direction. The authors, splendidly qualified for their task by close association with the leaders of the school, have done their work in a very satisfactory manner and earned the gratitude of students and scholars.

CHARLES BRUEHL

Overbrook Seminary

Elementary Social Statistics. By Thomas Carson McCormick. New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1941. Pp. x and 353. \$3.50

This introductory text in statistics for sociology students includes: Part I. Statistics in Social Research (Introductory, Quantification of Social Data, Factor Control, the Statistical Inquiry); Part II. Statistical Methods (Tabulation, Graphs, Averages and Rates, Measures of Deviation and Partition, Probability, Simple Linear Quantitative Correlation, Nonquantitative Correlation, Sampling, Significance of Differences, Time Series Analysis). The Appendix includes an explanation of logarithms, tables on the area and ordinate of the normal curve, chi-square, binomial coefficients, values of the correlation coefficient for different levels of significance, values of z (smell) for given values of r, squares and square roots, and logarithms.

The book is clear and concise. Excellent examples are given for the working of the different formulae.

Professor McCormick suggests limiting the introductory course to introductory data, tabulation, graphs, averages, measures of deviation, and simple linear correlation.

There are certain omissions that the instructor will probably wish to supplement, such as sources in sociology, suggestions for tabular form and making various diagrams.

Professor McCormick tested this material in mimeographed sheets in his social statistics classes. The book is practical and omits derivation to a large extent. It is excellent for sociology students.

MARGUERITE I. REUSS

Marquette University

Fundamentals of Social Psychology. By Emory S. Bogardus. 3rd edition. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co. 1942. Pp. xii and 538. \$3.50

This book is the third edition of a popular text in social psychology. The style is eclectic and follows no single school of psychology.

For the most part, the work deals with external behavior and the manifestation of emphasis on the causes of behavior. It is in this part, where the author discusses the psychological backgrounds of behavior, that the material is weakest. In Chapter 1 Dr. Bogardus deals with the "Origins of Behavior." The use of terms in this chapter leaves one confused. In one sentence the author says, "Human beings begin life as simple organic units but develop into complex personalities." This is a poor and inexact statement. Later the author says, "The processes whereby an organic human unit develops . . ." The "simple organic unit" of the first sentence quoted has become, in the sentence immediately above, "an organic human unit." In addition, Dr. Bogardus has it that ". . . human nature slowly and fitfully evolves . . ."

In spite of a general tendency to use terms more loosely than seems proper, there is no contention that behavior is mechanical. The author presents (rather uncritically, it is true) most of the standard theories. Behavior is classified into three main types: conditioned behavior, dynamic behavior, and directive behavior. The first is self-explanatory, dealing mildly with conditioning; the second or dynamic behavior is "original nature and conditioned behavior in action." This is behavior resulting from basic human urges, instincts, interests, desires, wants, etc. (the author lists some of the theories). The third type is quite interesting. This is directive behavior which "is human nature controlling both itself and the environment." Here the author strives for, but does not quite reach, a human, free will as a directive force in human behavior.

However, as was mentioned, the bulk of the book is concerned with the phenomena of external action. Here the material is better presented and in the hands of a teacher well acquainted with scholastic psychology can be useful as a text. Its lack of a critical approach can be put to use since the instructor can apply the criticism so badly needed.

PAUL J. MUNDIE

Marquette University

Introductory Sociology. By Leo J. Robinson, S.J., and Van Francis Christoph, S.J. Chicago: Loyola University Press. 1941. Pp. vii and 183. \$1.60

This book is called a "text and workbook." As a workbook it is admirable and will be found of use in classes in introductory sociology. It contains many sets of test questions, discussion sug-

gestions and written assignments. This work material is based very largely on the introductory texts in the field by Muntsch and Spalding, Murray, Ross and Willigan and O'Connor. Any instructor using one of these texts will find this book most useful for personal use and for student use.

As a text the work is less ambitious and less successful. The method used is strictly outline, arranged somewhat in form. This method, while in years past was most popular in texts in philosophy, religion and so on, is seldom used today and has been replaced by the discussion text. I rather doubt that this book could be used successfully unless the students had an additional text or unless there were many duplicate copies of the previously mentioned texts in the library.

There is a strong emphasis on social ethics. As a matter of fact, the text could easily be entitled social ethics or special ethics. Of course, this emphasis is good in itself. The situation of the world today proves beyond doubt that mankind is in tragic need of a knowledge of ethics. However, this present book gives very little attention to the study of social processes, the study of which is now regarded as proper function of sociology.

All students of sociology will want a copy of this book.

PAUL J. MUNDIE

Marquette University

Builders of the Social Order. By the Reverend Joseph Thorning. New York: Catholic Literary Guild. 1941. Pp. xvi and 183. \$1.50

This volume is a miscellaneous assemblage of Father Thorning's essays and articles written in recent years, most of which have appeared in various Catholic periodicals. Interviews with more or less important political figures of the last decade make up the bulk of the book. Eamon DeValera, Gerald P. Nye, Isidro Cardinal y Tomas, Joseph P. Kennedy, Heinrich Bruening, Getulio Vargas, Oswald Aranha, Edouard de Castelnau, Joseph Motta, Francisco Franco, Fulgencio Batista, Bishop George J. Caruana, and Huey P. Long express their opinions on a variety of socio-economic and political issues. There is a vigorous polemic in justification of the Franco regime (one fifth of the book is devoted to it) and a similarly enthusiastic though somewhat less lengthy *apologia* for Getulio Vargas, the president of Brazil, both of which discussions go far beyond the pale of the author's acknowledged purpose "to suggest practical democratic solutions to our social problems in the light of the papal encyclicals." Biographical sketches of converts like Herbert Ellsworth Cory and J. H. Jefferson Caffrey, essays on the "Jocists," "True Internationalism," and "Mary our Mother," and a critical appreciation of Vilfrid Pareto's socio-economic contributions complete the book. To this collection of essays has been given the unhappy title, *Builders of the Social Order*.

As an interesting panorama of colorful personalities in modern life, the book directs its appeal to a popular audience, and written in brisk, modern journalese it achieves that purpose. It is also heartening to discover that the men interviewed by Father Thorning are acquainted with the social encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI.

Serious students of social construction, however, will find the book disappointing. Summary in its analyses of personages, insufficiently critical of the views expressed, and preoccupied almost exclusively with political figures, *Builders of the Social Order* fails to give a balanced, acceptable picture of a modern solution to the social problem. Serious, also, is the absence of any mention of the many individuals who are making real contributions to the socio-economic order, which order, rather than the political, is the immediate concern of the social encyclicals.

Loyola University (Chicago)

EDWARD A. MARCINIAK

Crime and Its Treatment. By Arthur Evans Wood and John Barker Waite. New York: American Book Company. 1941. Pp. ix and 742. \$3.50

This is a new text for the introductory course in criminology. It belongs to the American Sociology Series edited by Kimball Young. It is, in fact, two books in one. The first section treats of the sociological aspects of crime and the second of the legal aspects of the same problem. Both parts are well done; the division of the book, however, makes it difficult to use as a text for the beginner in the field. The work could very readily be used for a two-semester course in criminology and penology.

The authors deserve praise for their efforts to be objective in avoiding partisan positions on the controversial questions in crime causation, punishment, and law. Certainly they have a definite philosophy, but they do not impose it upon others nor allow it to mar the logic and content of this contribution to the study of criminology. Unlike so many other books in criminology, we find here no theories or nostrums for the crime problem, but an honest attempt to provide a textbook.

The individual approach outlined in the chapter on "The Case Study" by Professor Wood is well done but all too brief. Certainly, an evaluation and mention of the excellent work being done in so many places was in order. The discussion on criminal law in the second half of the book is perhaps too inclusive and exhaustive for a work of this nature. The chapter on parole by Professor Wood manifests a deep knowledge not only of the theoretical but also of the practical issues of this problem.

Each chapter is followed by a select list of readings; but at times the references are too old to be of any practical use. Most of the references are valuable, and the authors are to be congratulated for listing the fine government publications on the various topics treated.

The book has been deservedly well received. If a little unwieldy for use as a text, it will take its place as a constant source of reference. The book concludes with a rather summary chapter on crime prevention, followed by a good, serviceable index.

RALPH A. GALLAGHER, S.J.

Loyola University (Chicago)

Criminology. By Eligius Weir, O.F.M. Joliet, Illinois: Institute for the Scientific Study of Crime. 1941. Pp. 349. \$3.00

The subtitle of this little volume is "A Scientific Study of the Modern Crime Problem." Based on Father Weir's many years of experience as Catholic Chaplain of the Illinois State Prisons at Joliet and Stateville, the book is a rather thoroughgoing censure of the present sanctions of our criminal laws and their administration, in a chatty, non-technical, readable style. None of the so-called "history" of penology with its rich admixture of fact and fancy as found in the typical texts under this general title, is to be found here. Thus the reader is spared the traditional story of the evolution of the penal system to its present state of futility.

The content of the book is derived from Father Weir's rich practical experience with and in one of the largest penal institutions of the country, amplified by generalizations that can reasonably be made on these rich data. One can probably correctly conclude that these experiences can be reproduced by any one of the other chaplains in the 50 or more penitentiaries throughout the United States. The fact that the book is so largely a record of personal experiences may account for and justify the complete absence of footnotes and references to previous writers in this field. There is an extensive index and a list of "Suggested Readings" as discursive as the myriad phenomena treated in the text.

Chapter XIX, the last in the book, is a nineteen-page "Proposed Program for the Diminution of Crime." Attention is directed generally to the real causes of crime, e. g., false education, irreligion, salacious literature and movies, our unjust economic system, our inept public officers and corrupt politicians, class immunity, and our outmoded system of law and law-enforcement. Pope Pius XI's Encyclical on Education is quoted at length, following which there is a 28-point program of legislation proposed more or less oblivious of the fact that we are united states — "or long have dreamed so." No one can gainsay the importance of a competent school system as a force in shaping social beings and discouraging anti-social conduct. It does, however, seem somewhat remote from the province of criminology to seek to establish such a system, though it is surely within the competence of a social scientist to analyze the maladjustment effected in a society where the program of criminal treatment represents something of a social lag with reference to that institution. Father Weir questions the practical value of capital punishment while admitting the ultimate right of the state to inflict it. Such an atti-

tude is quite common among those who deal directly with the people who have committed crimes.

SISTER MARY LIGUORI, B.V.M.

Mundelein College


Social Research. By George A. Lundberg. New York: Longmans Green & Co. 1942. Pp. xx and 425. \$3.25


Dr. Lundberg has rewritten an earlier work of the same title. Nearly all the material has been rewritten and new data are used throughout the book. This book is an excellent text for the course for senior majors in methodology, and it would also prove very useful as a text in a combined course of social statistics. Certainly no student should be graduated from college with a major in sociology who has less statistical knowledge than that represented by the statistical techniques discussed in this book. However, it must not be assumed that the book is a text in social statistics. It presents statistics only to the degree necessary for a good understanding of the methods in general use in sociology. If the student knows the material presented by Lundberg, he should be able to set up and carry out any reasonable social research problem.


The author spends a good deal of time discussing methods to be used under various circumstances and the care to be exercised in procedures such as sampling, scheduling, using the questionnaire, the making of scales, and the techniques of good field work.


If this book is not used as a text, it should at least be in every reference library.











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